In this paper, we propose two different solutions for making a recently proposed asymmetric fingerprinting protocol\nbased on client-side embedding robust to collusion attacks. The first solution is based on projecting a client-owned\nrandom fingerprint, securely obtained through existing cryptographic protocols, using for each client a different\nrandom matrix generated by the server. The second solution consists in assigning to each client a Tardos code, which\ncan be done using existing asymmetric protocols, and modulating such codes using a specially designed random\nmatrix. Suitable accusation strategies are proposed for both solutions, and their performance under the averaging\nattack followed by the addition of Gaussian noise is analytically derived. Experimental results show that the analytical\nmodel accurately predicts the performance of a realistic system. Moreover, the results also show that the solution\nbased on independent random projections outperforms the solution based on Tardos codes, for different choices of\nparameters and under different attack models.
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